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COMMENTS
MARTIN v. CITY OF DEL CITY:
A LOST OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PETITION
REBECCA A. CLAR*
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the Constitution, protects the
fundamental right of individuals to petition the government for
redress of grievances.2 In accordance with this constitutional
protection, the government may not condition public employment
upon the surrendering of the right to petition.3 The United
States Supreme Court has declared that in the context of a
retaliation claim alleging a First Amendment violation of
freedom of speech, government employees cannot challenge
adverse job actions unless the speech that prompted that action
involved a matter of public concern.4 A majority of the federal
- J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., The
State University of New York at Geneseo.
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.") (emphasis added).
2 See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,
465-66 (1979).
3 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (stating that "[flor at least
[fifteen] years, it has been settled that a State cannot condition public employment
on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of expression"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)
(stating same).
4 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 ("We hold only that when a public employee
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior.").
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circuit courts, however, have severely limited a government
employee's protection under the right to petition by holding that
this distinct right is also subject to the "public concern"
requirement, effectively nullifying any separate protection that
it may provide.5 Although a majority of the circuit courts have
analyzed the right to petition under the same standard as
freedom of speech in this context, the preceding issue continues
to be raised by plaintiffs and discussed by the circuit courts.6 In
recent years, dissenting opinions in the circuit courts,7 legal
commentary,8 and the comments of courts that have sided with
5 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Del City, 179 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1999); Grigley v.
City of Atlanta, 136 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 819 (1998);
Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997);
Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952
(1998); Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 1994); White Plains Towing
Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993); Rice v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 887
F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1989); Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1989); Belk v.
Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1988); Day v. South Park Indep. Sch.
Dist., 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985); Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.
1985); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984). But see San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 441-443 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that retaliation claims by
public employees alleging a violation of the First Amendment right to petition are
not subject to a "public concern" requirement).
The circuit courts improperly relied upon dicta in the Supreme Court decision,
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), in concluding that the right to petition, as
well as the freedom of speech, was subject to the "public concern" requirement. See
infra Part II.A.
6 In recent years, the circuit courts continued to decide the issue. See generally
Martin v. City of Del City, 179 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1999); Grigley v. City of Atlanta,
136 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 1998); Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107
F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997); Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1997).
7 In Valot, the Sixth Circuit adhered to the "public concern" requirement in the
context of a retaliation claim by a government employee under the right to petition.
See Valot, 107 F.3d at 1226. Yet, Circuit Judge Merritt asserted, in his concurring
and dissenting opinion, that he would follow the reasoning of San Filippo, 30 F.3d
at 442-holding that the retaliation claim under the right to petition was not
subject to a "public concern" requirement-because the right to petition is a
separate concept from the freedom of speech. See Valot, 107 F.3d at 1234 (Merritt,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Rendish, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the public concern requirement; yet,
Judge Reinhardt and Judge Tashima dissented from the denial of a rehearing en
banc. See Rendish, 134 F.3d at 1389. In the dissenting opinion, Judge Reinhardt
harshly criticized the court for relying on the dicta in McDonald as a basis for their
decision. See id. at 1392 ("McDonald, however, had absolutely nothing to do with
the use of the courts by public employees or others."). He stated that San Filippo
was correct in holding that a public employee discharge may not be based on the
filing of a "non-sham" petition, so long as the petition takes the form of a lawsuit.
See id. at 1393.
8 In recent years, this issue has raised a stir among authors who suggest that
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the majority of other circuits9 illustrate a current surge toward
recognizing a "modern" right to petition that deserves a separate
standard of analysis. Despite the reoccurrence of this issue, the
Supreme Court has refused to decide whether the "public
concern7 requirement applies to the right to petition and has
denied petition for writ of certiorari six times in the last three
years. 10 In Martin v. City of Del City,1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit failed to follow this growing
trend toward recognizing an independent petition right and
reluctantly joined the majority of other circuit courts holding
that a public employee's claim of retaliation in violation of the
First Amendment right to petition is subject to a public concern
requirement.' 2
John Martin was an employee of Del City ("City") from 1990
until his termination on June 6, 1996.13 On August 14, 1995,
Stan Greil, a City manager, ordered Martin transferred from his
position as supervisor of fleet maintenance to the position of
planning technician-a lower grade, and thus a demotion.' 4
Greil ordered the transfer because he received reports that
Martin sexually harassed a female City employee and a female
employee of one of the City's suppliers.' 5 After the transfer,
the public concern requirement is inapplicable to the right to petition in this
context. See, e.g., Margo Pave, Public Employees and the First Amendment Petition
Clause: Protecting the Rights of Citizen-Employees Who File Legitimate Grievances
and Lawsuits Against Their Government Employers, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 304, 306-07
(1995) (arguing that courts should not automatically apply the standard governing a
public employee's freedom of speech to the right to petition); Kara Elizabeth Shea,
Recent Development, San Filippo v. Bongiovanni: The Public Concern Criteria and
the Scope of the Modern Petition Right, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1730-34 (1995)
(pointing out that the Framers explicitly established the right to petition in the
Constitution and suggesting that it is distinct from the freedom of speech).
9 See, e.g., Martin, 179 F.3d at 886 (finding the question intriguing, but
refusing to adopt the minority position); see also infra notes 28-45 and
accompanying text.
10 See U.S.L.W. Sept. 15, 1998. At that time, the United States Supreme Court
was being asked for the fifth time in three years to consider the issue. See id. After
this article was published, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of
Grigley v. Atlanta, 136 F.3d 752 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 819 (1998).
11 179 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1999).
12 See id. at 889 (holding that First Amendment claims must meet the "public
concern" test).
13 See id. at 883.
14 See id. at 884.
15 See id. at 884. Greil ordered the transfer to remove Martin from the work
area where the alleged sexual harassment had occurred. See id. Greil provided
Martin with a written statement of the alleged reasons for his transfer.
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Martin filed an appeal of the transfer order with the Del City
Civil Service Commission ("Commission"), pursuant to Section
38 of the Del City Charter.16 On March 6, 1996, Martin and his
attorney met with City officials to negotiate his separation from
employment. 17 The parties initially agreed to a settlement that
would pay Martin a lump sum to cover six pay periods in
addition to various other payments.'8 At this time, the City
placed Martin on administrative leave with pay.19  The
settlement, however, was not finalized.20 For the next two
months, the City submitted drafts of the separation agreement
to Martin, one of which reduced the number of pay periods from
six to four.21 Martin eventually rejected the settlement offer and
returned to work on May 8, 1996.22 The City notified Martin
that he had abused the grievance process and that if he did not
execute the separation document as prepared, he would be
terminated.23 On June 6, 1996, Greil terminated Martin.24
In Martin, the Tenth Circuit failed to recognize a distinct
right to petition by commencing its discussion of Martin's right
(1) Martin had made sexually offensive remarks to a female employee
which resulted in a complaint against the city to the E.E.O.C.; (2) Martin
had made sexually offensive remarks, displayed sexually offensive
behavior, and made unwanted sexual advances to a female supplier
representative, as well as having made sexual remarks to female
subordinates, including solicitations for sexual favors in exchange for pay
checks and benefits; (3) Martin created and fostered unsatisfactory
working relationships with other departments and divisions; (4) he
improperly used city equipment; and (5) he engaged in insubordination by
failing to serve on a policy review committee after being appointed to the
committee.
Id.
16 See id. "Section 38 provides that a city employee may appeal to the
Commission any decision that terminates, suspends without pay, demotes or
removes the employee." Id. This section "also entitles the appealing employee to a
public hearing." Id.
17 See id.
18 See id. These other payments included "pay for any unused vacation and
compensatory time, pay for unused accrued sick leave, and pay for the March
premium for Martin's medical plan plus a sum equal to five times the monthly cost
of the premium." Id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id. The City claimed a credit for the sums paid to Martin while he was on
administrative leave. See id. at 885.
22 See id. at 884.
23 See id. at 885.
24 See id.
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to petition claim with the "multi-tiered" test used to determine
whether the government violated a public employee's First
Amendment freedom of speech.25 The court analyzed whether
the "public concern" requirement necessary to establish a
violation of the freedom of speech is also applicable to the right
to petition.26 Admittedly, the Tenth Circuit devoted much more
attention to this issue than the majority of other circuit courts
that have decided the matter.27 The court considered in detail
the case of San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,28 the only circuit court
decision that did not subject the right to petition to a "public
concern7 requirement.29 The Tenth Circuit referred to the
decision in San Filippo as a "scholarly opinion," providing a
"thoughtful analysis [which] demonstrates the difficulty of the
question before us."30 The court, however, still refused to accept
the logical reasoning in San Filippo and reverted to the same
analysis employed by the majority of circuit courts.31 In order to
justify the application of the "public concern" requirement to a
petition claim, the Tenth Circuit, as most other circuit courts,
25 See id. at 886. The court listed the steps for determining whether there was a
free speech violation. See id. First, the court must determine "whether the public
employee's speech at issue touches upon matters of public concern." Id. (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). If so, the court "must balance the
interest of the public employee in making the statement against the government-
employer's interest 'in promoting the efficiency of [its services].' " Id. (citing
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Then, the plaintiff "must
show that the constitutionally protected expression was a motivating factor in the
adverse employment decision." Id. (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Finally, if the plaintiff satisfies these elements, "the
burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same employment decision 'even in the absence of the
protected conduct.' "Id. (citation omitted).
26 See Martin, 179 F.3d at 887-89.
2 See, e.g., Grigley v. City of Atlanta, 136 F.3d 752, 755 (11th Cir. 1998)
(declaring, with little analysis, that the "public concern" requirement is applicable
to the right to petition); Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1985)
(immediately equating a grievance with freedom of speech and applying the "public
concern" requirement).
23 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994).
29 See id. at 443. In San Filippo, the court set forth a separate standard of
analysis for retaliation claims under the right to petition, that considers whether
the petition is "non-sham" and whether a formal grievance mechanism was used.
See id.
30 Martin, 179 F.3d at 888-89. The court also recognized that plaintiff Martin's
argument that petitioning does not need to be of a public concern to be protected by
the First Amendment "enjoys impressive support from some quarters" and "requires
careful consideration." Id. at 886.
31 See id. at 886-89.
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relied on dicta from a Supreme Court case, McDonald v. Smith,32
which commented that "there is no sound basis for granting
greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition to the President than other First Amendment
expressions."33 This dicta, so heavily relied upon by the circuit
courts to support the application of a public concern requirement
to petition claims, is taken out of the context of the McDonald
decision, which had "absolutely nothing to do with use of the
courts by public employees or others."34
The Martin court incorrectly asserted that it must follow, as
binding precedent, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Schalk v.
Gallemore,35 which embraced the public concern requirement for
the right to petition.36 Actually, the Schalk case opened the door
for the Tenth Circuit to distinguish the form of petition at issue
in Martin and reject the "public concern" requirement in this
context. In Schalk, a hospital employee hand-delivered a letter
to hospital board members that described her concerns about
certain practices at the hospital.37 Schalk was informed that she
would be discharged if she made further complaints. 38 She was
eventually terminated because she spoke with a board member
about planning a subsequent meeting with the board to discuss
her concerns.3 9 The Schalk court held that the letter and
comments to the board member addressed a matter of public
concern and stated that "[i]n the instant case, Schalk's right to
petition is inseparable from her right to speak. As such, we see
32 472 U.S. 479 (1985). In McDonald, the Court held that the Petition Clause
does not provide absolute immunity from damages in a defamation suit arising from
the content of petitions. See id. at 482.
33 Id. at 485.
34 Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 134 F.3d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998); see also infra Part HA.
35 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990).
36 See Martin, 179 F.3d at 889 ("Of course, this panel must follow Schalk's
holding, there being no intervening Supreme Court opinion and no en banc ruling by
our court changing Schalk's application of the principles relating to the Petition
Clause .. ").
37 See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1990) (describing
Schalk's letter that expressed her concern regarding benefits she felt were unevenly
distributed to employees).
38 See id. at 493 (characterizing her conduct as unacceptable because her
allegations did not "directly relate to [her] job or its performance").




no reason to subject this claim to a different sort of analysis."40
As was noted in the Third Circuit's San Filippo decision, the
Schalk court had difficulty drawing a meaningful distinction
between the speech found in the petition and other employee
speech in that case.41 As in the Supreme Court decision in
McDonald v. Smith,42 the "petition" at issue was only a letter,
and thus "properly analyzable" under the public concern
standard applicable to speech. 43 The Martin court failed to take
this opportunity to properly distinguish the "petition" at issue in
Schalk from a formal lawsuit or grievance directed at the
government employer, as in Martin.44 As opposed to the letter in
Schalk, the "formal mechanism for the redress of grievances"
that Martin employed is within the scope of protection afforded
by the Petition Clause.45 Yet, the Martin court failed to
distinguish Schalk and thus passed up the opportunity to restore
the protection provided by the First Amendment right to petition
for government employees.
It is submitted that the rationale of the Tenth Circuit is
flawed because the court failed to recognize a distinct standard
for the right to petition. Although the court admittedly
discussed the right to petition in greater detail than many other
circuit courts, the final decision to subject the right to petition to
a "public concern" requirement in the context of a retaliation
claim by a public employee fails to take into account the long-
standing, prominent history of the petition right; the Supreme
Court decisions concerning the right to petition; recent views of
judges and commentators; and the numerous policy issues
involved. The court's failure to distinguish the type of "petition"
40 Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 498; see also San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 439 (3d Cir.
1994).
42 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
43 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439 ("As in McDonald, because the 'petition' at issue
[in Schalk] was simply a letter imposing on the government no obligation to
respond, it was properly analyzable under the conventional Connick rubric
applicable to speech."); see also infra Part IIA.
44 Compare San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439 ("The case at bar is unlike Schalk in the
sense that what San Filippo characterizes as 'petitions' are not letters to the
government-employer, but lawsuits and grievances directed at the government-
employer .... Submissions of this sort purport to invoke formal mechanisms for the
redress of grievances."). In Martin's case, he initiated a lawsuit or grievance that
was directed at the government-employer. See Martin v. City of Del City, 179 F.3d
882, 884 (10th Cir. 1999).
45 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439; see also infra Part H.B.1.
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at issue in this particular case represents a lost opportunity to
restore the protection that the First Amendment strives to
provide for government employees, and has the destructive effect
of permitting the government to discharge a public employee
with a legitimate grievance or lawsuit.
This Comment asserts that the right to petition is distinct
from the freedom of speech, and thus a public employee's
retaliation claim in violation of the right to petition should be
subject to a separate analysis that does not include a public
concern requirement. Part I of this Comment focuses on the
distinction between freedom of speech and the right to petition.
Subpart A summarizes the prominent and distinct historical
development of the right to petition. Subpart B discusses the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution to embody these
distinctions within the First Amendment. Subpart C analyzes
the Supreme Court decisions that discuss the right to petition.
Part II of this Comment discusses the analysis of the public
employee's right to petition. Subpart A criticizes the incorrect
analysis of the majority of circuit courts considering this issue.
Subpart B focuses on the proper standard to analyze a public
employee's retaliation claim under the right to petition,
including policy reasons for recognizing a separate standard for
this right.
I. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
RIGHT TO PETITION
A. Historical Development of the Right to Petition
Historically, the right to petition was recognized as a
distinct and superior right compared to other First Amendment
rights.46 The petition right was recognized long before the right
to free speech.47 "The right to petition first emerged in England
with King John's signing of the Magna Carta in 1215," 48 which
46 See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government
for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
15, 17 (1993) (discussing the superiority of the right to petition over other First
Amendment rights).
47 See Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging.. .": An Analysis of
the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1168
(1986) (discussing differences between petitioning and speech in Eighteenth
Century England).
48 Pave, supra note 8, at 307. The right granted by the Magna Carta was
490 [Vol.74:483
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predated any recognition of the rights to speech or press. In
1689, William and Mary were offered the crown on the condition
that they accept the Declaration of Rights (later codified as the
Bill of Rights) which stated not only that it is "the right of [the]
subjects to petition the king," but also that "all [commitments]
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal."49 While the
Bill of Rights provided explicit protection for the right to
petition, the individual rights of speech and press were not even
mentioned.50 The importance of the right to petition was also
made apparent when Blackstone, in his Commentaries, stated:
If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement
of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law
is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth
subordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely,
the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament,
for the redress of grievances .... 51
In light of its prominent history, "[t]here is no persuasive reason
for the right of petition to mean less today than it was intended
to mean in England three centuries ago."52
The colonists in America also recognized the right to petition
before the right to freedom of speech. 53 The early colonial
governments recognized petitioning as an independent right, and
many colonies provided explicit protection for the right to
petition in their charters. 54 In 1774, the Declaration and
limited because only Barons could petition the Crown; there was no method of
enforcement; and the petitioner could be subsequently punished for exercising the
right. See id. The recognition of this right was significant in and of itself because the
Crown did not recognize any right to free speech or press. See id. The right to
petition was not a "fully matured, absolute right" in England until 1702. See Smith,
supra note 47, at 1153.
49 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 W.
& M., 2d Sess., ch. 2, § 5 (1689) (Eng.)); see also Smith, supra note 47, at 1162
(quoting same).
50 See Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 34; see also Smith, supra note 47, at 1180
("The state of affairs in Eighteenth Century England manifest that petitioning was
[in] practice an absolute right while speech and press were the constant in subjects
of seditious libel prosecutions and other restraints.").
51 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443 n.23 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMVIENTARIES *143).
52 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443.
53 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) ("[Tihe historical roots of
the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution."); see also Spanbauer, supra
note 46, at 27-28. "As in England, petitioning in America was not originally a
meaningful right." Id. at 29.
54 See Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 27-28. "In 1641 the Massachusetts Body of
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Resolves of the First Continental Congress proclaimed that the
colonists "have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their
grievances, and petition the King; and that all prosecutions,
prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are
illegal."55 Thus, the right to petition was deeply rooted in Anglo-
American history long before the Framers incorporated this right
into the Constitution.56
Even after England and its American colonies recognized
freedom of speech rights, they did not afford as much protection
to the freedom of speech as they did to the right to petition.57 The
right to petition encompassed freedom from punishment for
petitioning;58 yet, free speech rights had no such protection.59
While the colonial government had removed prior restraints on
speech, this removal of restraints was replaced with the
possibility of subsequent punishment for seditious libel.60 In
reality, the freedom of speech meant nothing more than an
absence of prior restraints,61 whereas the right to petition had
evolved to the point where the government did not sanction
Liberties became the first colonial charter to provide explicit protection for the right
to petition." Id. at 27. "By the time of the American Revolution, Delaware, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont also provided explicit
protection for [this] right...." Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
55 Smith, supra note 47, at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 32 (noting that the Declaration and Resolves were
modeled after the English Bill of Rights).
56 See Pave, supra note 8, at 307 (noting that the petition right has been in
existence longer than other First Amendment rights).
57 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1180.
58 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1166 ("By the time of the American Revolution,
petitioning had become extremely popular in England; it was no longer checked or
penalized and was frequently successful.").
59 See Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 37 ("Seditious libel laws existed in all of the
colonies, and punishment for statements critical of the government was an accepted,
lawful practice which continued even after the framing and ratification of the First
Amendment.") (footnote omitted).
60 See id. at 36 ("As in England, the colonial government removed these prior
restraints on speech only to replace them with the possibility of subsequent
punishment for seditious libel."). "In both England and colonial America,
presentation of a petition to government was not a 'publication' under the existing
libel law." Id. at 38. If the petition was subsequently published, the petitioner "could
be subject to prosecution for seditious libel, but not for the subject matter of the
petition...." Id. It has been stated that "[t]hese features distinguished petitioning
from the rights of speech and the press and held petitioning in a superior status."
Id.
61 See id. at 36 (noting that both the British citizens and the American colonists
knew that their freedom of speech was limited by libel restrictions).
[Vol.74:483
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punishment for the subject matter of petitions. 62 Thus, it has
been recognized that "[tlhe existence of both state seditious libel
laws and the Federal Sedition Act coupled with the failure to
prosecute petitioners under those laws indicate that there was
no original intention to raise freedom of speech and the press to
the level of protection given to petitioning."63 Compared to the
subsequent freedoms of speech and the press, "the right to
petition was far less restricted and was the only authorized
means by which individuals could speak out against
governmental action."64 This history illustrates that the right to
petition granted greater protection than other First Amendment
rights and was thus more meaningful than the freedom of
speech.
B. Intent of the Framers
The Founding Fathers were cognizant of the greater
protections afforded to the right to petition than the freedom of
speech.65 As such, the ratification of the First Amendment's
Petition Clause codified a right to petition that was historically
recognized with the breadth of its protection already
established.66 The history of the right to petition is critical
because the United States Supreme Court has declared that the
rights included in the Bill of Rights must be preserved as they
6 See id. at 33.
63 Id. at 39. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to "write, print, utter or
publish.., any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either House of the Congress... or the
President... with intent to defame... or to bring them.., into contempt or
disrepute .... " Law of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). Therefore, it became
obvious that the adoption of the Constitution had not eliminated restraints on
speech and press. See Smith, supra note 47, at 1176.
64 Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 37-38 (explaining that the minimal restriction
on petitioning can likely be explained by the fact that petitions do not pose the same
type of threats as does published speech); see also Smith, supra note 47, at 1175
("[Elvidence of limitations placed upon the right to petition during [post-
Revolutionary America] is nonexistent [sic]."). The freedom of the press was limited
by press licensing laws that restricted expression to those few printers the
government approved. See Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 36.
65 See Pave, supra note 8, at 310 (noting that, prior to the Constitution, the
right to petition was treated with greater deference than the right to speak).
66 See id. at 310-11 (stating that, by ratifying the Petition Clause, the colonists
essentially codified a recognized right); see also Emily Calhoun, Initiative Petition
Reforms and the First Amendment, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 130 (1994)
("Petitioning was a primary source of bills in pre-constitutional America.").
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existed under the English common law in 1791.67 There is no
doubt that the history of the right to petition, which was at that
time an absolute right against the government, had a great
influence on the intent of the Framers of the First Amendment.68
Congress approved the right to petition without much
comment, and there are very few recordings of the debates
concerning state ratification of this right.69 It appears that
James Madison, draftsman of the First Amendment, supported
the view that petitioning is a "preferred and distinct right."70
When Madison first introduced his proposed list of amendments,
the clause containing the rights of assembly and petition were
separate from the clauses containing the freedoms of speech and
the press.71 While the records concerning the right to petition
may be sparse, "they evince no intent to change the original
British and colonial experiences whereby the right to petition
67 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1181 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193
(1974)); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)
(employing the longstanding "historical test" in determining whether the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in a patent infringement action).
68 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1180-81 (discussing the history of the Petition
Clause). Furthermore, prior to the American Revolution, the rights of speech, press,
and assembly were subject to widespread suppression. See id. at 1181; see also Gary
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739,
742 (1999) ("The inclusion of the right to petition in the First Amendment...
existed in 1789 and 1790 just as surely as it did in 1791."); Gregory A. Mark, The
Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2157 (1998) ("For the colonists and citizens of the early
republic, petitioning embodied important norms of political participation in
imperfectly representative political institutions .... ").
69 See Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 42 (observing that the records of debates
surrounding the right to petition are sparse); see also James E. Pfander, Sovereign
Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 954-55 (1997)
(noting that "the Petition Clause was not the subject of illuminating debate[,]" but
that "[n]either the senate debates nor the debates in the legislatures of the ratifying
states were officially recorded"); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the
Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 155-
56 (1986) (noting that Congress approved the right to petition as being absolute).
70 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1182. But see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945) (noting that the freedom of speech and freedom to petition "though not
identical, are inseparable").
71 See Higginson, supra note 69, at 155-56; see also Spanbauer, supra note 46,
at 39 (noting that, in 1789 when Madison introduced his proposed amendments, the
rights of assembly and petition were envisioned as separate amendments). The text
of the original clause stated: "The people shall not be restrained from peaceably
assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the
legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances."
Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 39.
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was subject to few restrictions."72
This construction of the First Amendment also suggests that
the Framers did not intend to subsume the right to petition
within the protections of the freedom of speech.73 Although the
right to petition and freedom of speech are found within the
same Amendment, they are clearly separated into two distinct
clauses.74 The right to petition is "the last in the list of rights
granted in the First Amendment; it was a concept separate from
free speech in the minds of the authors of the Bill of Rights."75
C. Supreme Court Decisions
It is well settled that the First Amendment protects the
right of individuals to "petition the government for redress of
grievances."76 Furthermore, a state cannot "condition public
employment on a basis that infringes the employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression."77
72 Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 42; see also Eric Schnapper, 'Libelous" Petitions
for Redress of Grievances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV.
303, 345 (1989) ("[Tlhere is absolutely no contemporaneous history suggesting that
anyone connected with the framing and approval of the [P]etition [C]lause...
intended any limitation on the right to petition as it had existed under English law
prior to the Revolution and as it continued in the several states.").
73 See Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1234 (6th
Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (expressing that, in the minds of the Framers of
the Bill of Rights, the right to petition the government was a notion separate from
the freedom of speech); see also San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, .30 F.3d 424, 442 (3d
Cir. 1994) (stating that the Petition Clause was not intended to be "a graceful but
redundant appendage of the clauses guaranteeing freedom of speech and press").
74 See Martin v. City of Del City, 179 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"the First Amendment separates the Petition Clause from the Free Speech Clause").
A cursory analysis of the text of the First Amendment suggests that the petition
right and freedom of speech are separate because a semi-colon separates them. See
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. But see
Mark, supra note 68, at 2155 (noting that the right to petition "has been almost
completely collapsed into the other rights that the First Amendment protects").
75 Valot, 107 F.3d at 1234 (Merritt, J., dissenting). But see Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to
freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances.").
76 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979). The
right to petition for grievances may be exercised by filing a lawsuit and petitioning
the courts for relief. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
77 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); see also Keyishian v. Board of
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Although the Supreme Court clearly stated that public
employees are protected by the First Amendment right to
petition, the actual degree of protection afforded by this right is a
little more unc6rtain.78 There are no Supreme Court decisions
that specifically address the scope of the First Amendment right
to petition in the context of a retaliation claim by a public
employee. 79 The leading case regarding a public employee's
rights under the First Amendment, Connick v. Myers,80 was in
the context of a free speech claim. In Connick, the Court held
that a public employee who seeks to recover pursuant to a
section 1983 claim,8' on grounds that adverse action has been
taken against him or her because of the exercise of First
Amendment freedom of speech rights, must establish that the
speech "constitute[d] ... a matter of public concern ... ."82 The
Court justified the public concern requirement by reasoning that
"government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment." 3 Although the Supreme Court
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (confirming the longstanding rejection of a
theory that public employment may be subjected to conditions that infringe the
liberties of religion and expression).
78 See supra note 5 (noting the division in the circuit courts as to whether there
is a "public concern" requirement for a retaliation claim under the right to petition).
79 See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424,442 (3d Cir. 1994).
80 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing a remedy for persons whose
constitutional rights have been deprived "under the color of any statute, regulation,
custom, or usage").
82 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. The Court held that:
[Wihen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.
Id. at 147.
The standard as to whether a matter is of "public concern" is determined by
the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record." Id. at 147-48. This standard has been criticized due to the vague criteria for
determining exactly what constitutes a matter of "public concern," and circuit courts
have offered various definitions of this standard. See Shea, supra note 8, at 1714-15
(criticizing the "Connick public concern test" and its application to the Petition
Clause). It has been stated that, "arguably[,] all government employee speech which
discloses wrongdoing and inefficiency is of relevance to public debate and thus
entitled to protection . . . ." Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government
Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of "Efficiency," 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 23
(1996).
83 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675
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established the public concern requirement for government
employees asserting a violation of their freedom of speech,84 this
decision is expressly limited to the First Amendment freedom of
speech. Despite the Supreme Court's failure to make any
mention of the Petition Clause in the Connick decision,85 many
circuit courts have applied the public concern requirement to
retaliation claims under the First Amendment right to petition.8 6
Just as the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the
issue of a public employee's claim of retaliation under the right
to petition, there are also relatively few Supreme Court First
Amendment decisions which have addressed the right to petition
in any context.8 7 Yet, the existing decisions suggest that the
Supreme Court is committed to providing a basic level of
protection for an individual's right to petition and have set forth
distinct guidelines for analyzing this right.88 In the 1960s and
1970s, the Court recognized the Petition Clause as a source of
immunity from the penalties of conflicting federal law in cases
arising from alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8 9
(1994) ("The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisions,
then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and
efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts
as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.").
84 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent sets forth a
different view. See id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether a
public employee's speech addresses a matter of "public concern" should only be
relevant "when the statements at issue... may have an adverse impact on the
government's ability to perform its duties efficiently"); see also Pave, supra note 8,
at 314 (noting that many commentators have criticized the public concern
requirement as being too narrow to "adequately protect the free speech rights of
individuals that work for their government").
85 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
85 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing circuit court decisions that
have applied the public concern standard to the right to petition).
87 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 68, at 739 (referring to the right to
petition as "the First Amendment's poor relation"); Spanbauer, supra note 46, at 16
("Of [the First Amendment's] expressive rights, the right to petition has engendered
the least discussion among litigants, judges and scholars."); Note, A Petition Clause
Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implication for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1993) ("[Clourts and scholars alike have virtually ignored
the Petition Clause in developing First Amendment jurisprudence.").
88 See Pave, supra note 8, at 317 (noting that the Supreme Court's right to
petition jurisprudence is particularly committed to protecting the right of access to
the court system).
89 See Shea, supra note 8, at 1703-05 (analyzing the Supreme Court's right to
petition jurisprudence in the context of cases arising from alleged antitrust
violations).
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In Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight,90 the Supreme Court held that barring the railroads
from joining together to lobby Congress for changes in the law
would violate the plaintiffs rights under the Petition Clause.91
The Court stated that "[t]he right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of
course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms."92 Later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,93 the
Court permitted unions to collectively petition the Secretary of
Labor regarding minimum wages, even though the petitioning
was intended to eliminate competition and would violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 94
After acknowledging a level of protection under the petition
right, the Supreme Court declared that this protection is not
absolute.95 As recognized in California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited,96 the petition right is limited by the "mere
sham" exception.97 The Court held that if a petition were
meritless-a "mere sham7 used to reach an otherwise illegal
90 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
91 See id. at 137-38. The Court reiterated that "no violation of the [Sherman
Antitrust] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws." Id. at 135.
92 Id. at 138.
93 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
94 See id. at 670. It has been recognized that in Noerr, the Petition Clause
received little mention, and in Pennington, it received no mention at all. See Shea,
supra note 8, at 1704. In both cases, the Court seemed more concerned about the
First Amendment right of association. See id. The court did not fully acknowledge
the impact of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine until 1972 in California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). See Shea, supra note 8, at 1704.
95 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) ("Nor do the Court's
decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation
indicate that the right to petition is absolute.").
96 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
97 See id. at 511. The "mere sham" exception to Petition Clause protection was
developed from dicta in the Noerr case. See Eastern Railroad President's Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) ("There may be situations in which
a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is
a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified."). In California Motor, the Court held that
antitrust laws could not be construed to prohibit the filing of legitimate lawsuits
because this would defeat the right to petition. See California Motor, 404 U.S. at
510-11. The Court extended its decision to include the petitioning of administrative
agencies and the right of access to the courts. See id.
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end-it would not constitute protected activity.98  In Bill
Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB,99 the Court further developed
this limitation by stating that "baseless litigation is not
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition."100 The
Court explained that "since sham litigation by definition does not
involve a bona fide grievance, it does not come within the [Flirst
[A]mendment right to petition."10 1 Furthermore, in McDonald v.
Smith,10 2 the Court held that the Petition Clause does not
provide absolute immunity against libel for the content of
petitions. 0 3 As discussed below, many circuit courts have
incorrectly cited the McDonald decision as authority for the
application of the "public concern" requirement to right to
petition claims. 104
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
A. Incorrect Analysis by the Majority Of Circuit Courts
A majority of circuit courts have incorrectly applied the
"public concern" requirement to the right to petition without any
guidance from the Supreme Court.10 5 While a focus on content is
consistent with the Supreme Court's approach to the freedom of
speech, this focus does not correspond with the Court's doctrine
regarding the right to petition.106 The Supreme Court has
limited the right to petition to protect only non-sham
98 California Motor, 404 U.S. at 511.
9 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
100 Id. at 743. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB., the Court held that
the filing of a legitimate lawsuit by an employer could not be enjoined as an unfair
labor practice even if the employer's only reason for initiating the suit was to
retaliate against an employee's exercise of rights protected by the National Labor
Relations Act. See id.
101 Id. at 743 (quoting Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust
Laws, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 39, 60 (1980)).
102 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
103 See id. at 482 (affiraing the decision of the district court and the Fourth
Circuit).
104 See infra Part HA.
105 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
106 See Pave, supra note 8, at 332 ("A content focus, while consonant with the
Connick Court's approach to determining the reach of the Free Speech Clause, is not




litigation;10 7 yet, the Court has never limited the right to petition
to protect only those petitions that involve a matter of public
concern. Furthermore, it has been asserted that "[tihe petition
clause should not be interpreted to permit retaliation for filing a
legitimate unemployment compensation case anymore than it
permits retaliation against individuals making legitimate claims
for racial, gender or religious discrimination." 08
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to
petition as a distinct clause of the First Amendment that
deserves a different standard to determine the degree of
protection,10 9 the majority of circuit courts incorrectly applied the
Connick "public concern" requirement to retaliation claims by
public employees under the right to petition.110 The circuit
courts came to this conclusion as a result of an improper,
careless analysis of dicta in McDonald v. Smith."' In McDonald,
the respondent filed a libel action, alleging that while respondent
was being considered for the position of United States Attorney,
petitioner wrote two letters to President Reagan and other
government officials which contained false, slanderous, libelous,
inflammatory, and derogatory statements concerning the
respondent. 112 The petition claimed that the Petition Clause
granted him absolute immunity from liability because the letters
could be characterized as petitions. 113 The Supreme Court held
that the right to petition does not provide absolute immunity
from damages for libel. 114 A majority of circuit courts have
asserted that the language in McDonald equates the rights to
petition and freedom of speech, and thus, both rights are subject
to the public concern requirement. Specifically, these courts
107 See supra Part I.C.
108 Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1234 (6th
Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt added that "[wie do not import the
'public concern' test into due process, equal protection or other constitutional claims.
Why do so here?" Id.
109 See supra Part I.C.
110 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing the factual
background of the Supreme Court's "public concern" requirement).
111 See infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
112 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1985).
113 See id. at 481-82.
114 See id. at 485. Commentators have criticized the decision in McDonald for
failing to accurately recognize the historically superior status of the Petition Clause
and severely narrowing the scope of the right to petition as recognized by the
Framers of the First Amendment. See e.g., Pave, supra note 8, at 319-23.
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relied on dicta in the case which states that "[t]he right to
petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of
that Amendment,"115 and "there is no sound basis for granting
greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition to the President than other First Amendment
expressions." 116
The reliance on this dicta in McDonald is improper because
the issue decided by the Supreme Court in that case was limited
to the context of defamation." 7 The sole issue addressed by the
Court was whether a person defamed in a letter was barred from
suing the writer because the letter had been addressed to the
President and "could thus be characterized as a 'petition' within
the meaning of the First Amendment."118 The decision in
McDonald had "absolutely nothing to do with the use of the
courts by public employees or others."119 Thus, the McDonald
decision should not be used as a basis for determining the rights
of public employees to petition the government.
Furthermore, in McDonald, the Petition Clause did not
protect any right that was not already protected by the Freedom
of Speech Clause because the petition consisted of a letter to the
115 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482.
116 Id. at 485. The Court also stated that "[tihe Petition Clause... was inspired
by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak,
publish, and assemble." Id.
117 The Supreme Court made various statements which illustrate that this
decision is limited to the specific issue of absolute immunity for libel. The Court
specifically stated that its holding is limited when it said that it "granted certiorari
to decide whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides absolute
immunity to a defendant charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods
in letters to the President of the United States." Id. at 480 (emphasis added). The
Court also stated that "it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment
believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for
libel." Id. at 483 (emphasis added). This limited holding also may be inferred from
the Court's statement that "[nior do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition
Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is
absolute." Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
118 See Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 134 F.3d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe case concerned the question whether a libelous
letter written to President Reagan about a U.S. attorney candidate deserved special
protection because it could be characterized as a 'petition.' "); San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424,442 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the Court's decision
in McDonald was limited to "whether one who was defamed in a letter was disabled
from suing the letter-writer by virtue of the fact that the letter was written to the
President and could thus be characterized as a petition'....").
119 Rendish, 134 F.3d at 1392 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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President. 120  The difficulty in distinguishing between the
freedom of speech and right to petition provided a logical basis
for the Court's ruling in McDonald that words about a public
figure should not be immunized simply because they appear in a
letter characterized as a petition.' 21 The Court asserted that
although the right to petition is guaranteed, the "right to commit
libel with impunity is not."122 It seems to follow that the Court
was merely concerned with the possibility that libelous
statements, cloaked in the form of a petition, would escape
punishment.123
If the majority of circuit courts incorrectly analyzed public
employee retaliation claims by improperly relying on McDonald
as suggested, these courts have seriously undermined the
strength of the separate and distinct right to petition. Under the
rationale of a majority of circuit courts, the right to petition has
no independent meaning.124 Effectively, the Petition Clause
would only protect the speech within the petition, so long as the
speech within the petition regarded a matter of "public
concern."125 The act of petitioning would be given no protection
separate and independent from the freedom of speech.126 This
spineless view of the right to petition is clearly contrary to the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution.127 The result of the
application of the public concern requirement in this context is
that the employee's right to petition the government for redress
of grievances "is subsumed into the right of free speech,
effectively nullifying an independent First Amendment right."12
120 See San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439.
121 See id. ("[Ilt is difficult to distinguish in any meaningful way between words
contained in a letter to the President and words contained in, for example, an
advertisement appearing in.the New York Times"). The San Filippo court noted that
the letter-writer in McDonald sent copies of the letter to a Senator, three members
of the House of Representatives, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Presidential Adviser. See id. at 442 n.21.
122 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
123 See id.
124 See Pave, supra note 8, at 327.
12 See id.
126 See id.
127 See supra Part I.B.
128 Pave, supra note 8, at 324.
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A. The Correct Analysis of the Right to Petition
1. The San Filippo Standard
A public employee's retaliation claim under the right to
petition should not be subject to a "public concern"
requirement. 129 An analysis of the right to petition "should not
be treated as an exercise in speech" because petitioning is only
marginally related to speech. 130 Thus, the petition right should
not automatically be burdened with doctrine from the Freedom
of Speech Clause.1 1 The Third Circuit is the only circuit court
that has properly analyzed the public employee's right to
petition. 13 2 In San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,133 the Third Circuit
held that a public employee is protected against retaliation
under the Petition Clause for filing a petition in the nature of a
lawsuit or grievance regardless of whether the petition
addressed a matter of public concern.134 The court came to this
conclusion subsequent to an in-depth analysis of the historical
importance of the Petition Clause 135 and the previous Supreme
Court decisions regarding the scope of protection under the right
to petition.136 According to the Third Circuit:
12 See generally San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994).
120 Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1234 (6th
Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Filing an
unemployment compensation action, like hiring a lawyer, eating dinner before
making a speech or driving a car or catching a plane to a meeting, is related to
speech only marginally.").
131 See id. ("It makes little sense to burden the right of petition cases
automatically with doctrines from the Speech Clause ... ").
132 See generally San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 424. Some lower courts, however,
recognized a difference between the public employee's right to petition under the
Petition Clause and the Freedom of Speech Clause. See Stellmaker v. DePetrillo,
710 F. Supp. 891, 892 (D. Conn. 1989) (rejecting the government employer's
argument that because the teacher's grievance was a matter of private concern,
there was no protection from retaliation); Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F. Supp. 247, 262
(D.N.J. 1987) (stating that courts have found the right to access the courts protected
under the First Amendment without engaging in a "public concern" analysis).
13 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994). In San Filippo, a tenured professor who was
dismissed from Rutgers University filed a lawsuit alleging that he was dismissed in
retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment right to petition. See id. at 426-
30. His activities included the filing of numerous complaints, grievances, and suits
regarding a variety of conditions and policies at the University. See id.
134 See id. at 442-43.
135 See id. ("[T]he right to petition has a pedigree independent of-and
substantially more ancient-than the freedoms of speech and press.").
M See id. at 435-40; see also supra Part I.C.
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[WIhen government-federal or state-formally adopts a
mechanism for redress of those grievances for which
government is allegedly accountable, it would seem to
undermine the Constitution's vital purposes to hold that one
who in good faith files an arguably meritorious "petition"
invoking that mechanism may be disciplined for such
invocation by the very government that in compliance with the
[Pletition [C]lause has given the particular mechanism its
constitutional imprimatur. 37
The court found "an independent reason-a reason of
constitutional dimension-to protect an employee lawsuit or
grievance if it is of the sort that constitutes a 'petition' within the
meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment."138  The reason of
"constitutional dimension" was that the Petition Clause imposes
an obligation on the government to have "at least some channel
open for those who seek redress for perceived grievances."139 In
light of this obligation, it is unconstitutional for the government
to provide a channel for citizens to petition the government and
then deny them use of that channel through retaliatory
measures.14°
In accordance with Supreme Court authority,141 the San
Filippo court asserted that the only limit to the protection
granted by the right to petition in this context was whether the
grievances or lawsuits constituted a "petition" and whether the
petition was "non-sham."142  According to San Filippo, a
"petition" is characterized by "lawsuits and grievances directed
137 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442.
138 Id. at 441-42; see also Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107
F.3d 1220, 1234 (6th Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The constitutional wrong here is the act of retribution... for successfully
seeking benefits. Such an act makes ineffective a citizen's right to seek government
aid by requesting legitimate official or administrative relief and undermines the
right 'to petition for a redress of grievances.' ").
139 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 441-42. The court notes that through the
incorporation of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment liberty clause
imposes the same obligation on the states. See id.
140 See Pave, supra note 8, at 337; see also Valot, 107 F.3d at 1234 (Merritt, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that the act of retaliating
against government employees for seeking benefits was unconstitutional). Circuit
Judge Merritt also stated that the retaliatory acts make "ineffective a citizen's right
to seek government aid by requesting legitimate official or administrative relief and
undermines the right 'to petition for a redress of grievances.' "); Valot, 107 F.3d at
1234 (Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 See supra Part I.C.
142 See San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443.
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at the government-employer" that invoke "formal mechanisms
for the redress of grievances."14 The court's focus on the
difference between sham and non-sham petitions is consistent
with Supreme Court decisions such as California Motor
Transportation and Bill Johnson's Restaurants.1" The court
concluded that the "mere act of filing a non-sham petition is not
a constitutionally permissible ground for discharge of a public
employee."14
Although some courts"4 expressed concern that not applying
the public concern requirement would constitute "special
treatment of the right to petition [that] would unjustly favor
those who through foresight or mere fortuity present their
speech as a grievance rather than in some other form,"147 this
concern is unfounded and exaggerated.148 As the court in San
Filippo pointed out, the implications of publicly airing private
concerns as opposed to filing a petition regarding a private
matter are quite different. 149 The "public concern" requirement
expressed in Connick allows a public employee to be disciplined
for speech regarding an employment dispute of private concern
since the employee attempted to draw public attention to a
143 Id. at 439. The court stated that lawsuits, grievances, and workers
compensation claims share the feature of "invoking a formal mechanism for redress
of grievances against the government." Id. at n.18. Examples of formal government
adoption of a mechanism for the redress of grievances are "entry into a collective
bargaining agreement that provides for a grievance procedure" and a "waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of that sovereign." Id. at 442. The San
Filippo court distinguished the present case from that in McDonald v. Smith, 472
U.S. 479 (1985). See San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439. The San Filippo court recognized
that in McDonald "the 'petition' at issue was simply a letter... [which] was
properly analyzable under the conventional Connick rubric applicable to speech." Id.
Yet, in San Filippo, the "petition" at issue was a lawsuit or grievance. See id. The
characterization of a "petition" in San Filippo would alleviate the concerns of the
McDonald Court that mere speech in the form of a letter would be characterized as
a petition and thus receive greater protection. See supra Part H_4_
-" See generally Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983);
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); see also
supra Part LC.
145 San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443.
146 See, e.g., Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1988).
147 Id. at 1262.
148 See San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 438-39.
149 See id. at 442. The act of petitioning is less likely to cause a "discipline-
maintenance problem" for the government-employer than most acts of speech. Pave,
supra note 8, at 341. While responding to a grievance or lawsuit may generally be
done privately, acts of speech are generally "highly public" in nature. Id.
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private dispute.150 Yet, when a public employee files a petition,
the employee is not "appealing over government's head to the
general citizenry," but simply "asking [the] government to fix
what, allegedly, government has broken or has failed in its duty
to repair."151 When a public employee fies a petition, that
person is taking the appropriate steps to address the government
directly through the channels that they are constitutionally
obligated to institute.152 Yet, one who speaks publicly about
these concerns is not attempting to directly address the employer
through the appropriate channels. 153 When a public employee
properly seeks access to the courts, "something far more than
even free expression is at stake[-t]he very right to require the
government to obey the law and to redress the injuries it causes
its citizens is at issue. 154
B. Policy Reasons for Recognizing a Distinct Right to Petition
The impact of this limitation on the right to petition is
heightened due to the increasing number of Americans who work
for the government. 55 The requirement that a petition must be
of "public concern" allows no available means of recourse for a
public employee to assert a legitimate private complaint without
the possibility of punishment. 156 The court in San Filippo
expressed concern that if the government could freely discharge
150 See San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442. The court stated:
As applied to communications that are not petitions, the Connick rule
means that a public employee who goes public-e.g., by writing to the New
York Times-with an employment dispute that is not of "public concern"
runs the risk of being disciplined by her public employer for undertaking to
draw public attention to a private dispute.
Id.
151 Id.
152 See Pave, supra note 8, at 339.
163 See id.
154 Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 134 F.3d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). Judge Reinhardt goes on to state
that "[t]hat right [to petition] may not be lightly limited-or made to serve as the
basis for punitive or retaliatory governmental action." Id.
155 See Pave, supra note 8, at 304 ("With an increasing number of Americans
now working for their federal, state, and local governments, this limitation on
government power has grown in importance.").
156 See Rendish, 134 F.3d at 1390 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("There is no
contention [by the majority opinion] that Rendish should have pursued her claims
in any other forum. Under the panel's view of the law, it appears that her only




an employee invoking a formal grievance mechanism to present
a non-sham petition, "the [P]etition [C]lause of the [Flirst
[Almendment would, for public employees seeking to vindicate
their employee interests, be a trap for the unwary-and a dead
letter."157 Furthermore, the citizen's petition to the government
demanding redress of grievances often discloses and remedies
"incompetence, corruption, waste and other government
misconduct."158 Yet, a public employee is unlikely to file a
grievance or lawsuit challenging the misconduct if he or she
fears retaliatory discharge. 159 Thus, the extension of the "public
concern" requirement has a chilling effect on the filing of a
grievance or lawsuit, which may be necessary to challenge
governmental misconduct. 160 This, in effect, allows government
employers to avoid any check on their misconduct that the right
to petition provides. 161 Not only does this requirement prevent
public employees from properly petitioning their government-
employer, but it also encourages public employees to seek other
less peaceful remedies due to the possibility of termination or
other retaliatory actions as a result of filing a grievance or
petition.162
157 San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 442 (3d Cir. 1994). The court in
San Filippo added that "[tihe petition clause of the [F]irst [A]mendment was not
intended to be a dead letter-or a graceful but redundant appendage of the clauses
guaranteeing freedom of speech and press." Id.
M Smith, supra note 47, at 1178. "Public employees are [often] in the best
position to be aware of [and inform of] misconduct by others within the
government's employ," and "the threat of suit may deter official misconduct." Pave,
supra note 8, at 340.
IM See Pave, supra note 8, at 340.
160 See id. The result of extending the "public concern" requirement is that
public employees would not even attempt to file a petition regarding a legitimate
private matter for fear of the risk of getting fired. See id. at 341.
161 See id. Since the government agency would not be required to justify its
actions, "no one... would have reason to look into her grievance and the serious
claims it contains." Id. at 340. In addition, the employer would know that any court
would not question her decision because "the focus of the petitioning employee's
grievance was not a public matter." Id. at 341.
162 See Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 134 F.3d 1389, 1389 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also Smith, supra note
47, at 1179 ("The availability of petitioning as a popular right allows public feelings
to be expressed in a peaceful, orderly way and may be a foil to revolution."). In his
dissenting opinion in Rendish, Judge Reinhardt stated:
It will certainly come as a surprise to those who have taken seriously our
assertions that persons with legitimate grievances should settle their
disputes by peaceful means in the courts rather than through disruptive or




The United States Supreme Court must resolve the growing
controversy among the circuit courts in order to provide
government employees with the protection they deserve under
the First Amendment right to petition. The right to petition is
distinct from the freedom of speech, and thus a public employee's
retaliation claim in violation of the petition right deserves a
separate standard of analysis that does not include a "public
concern" requirement. The recent views of judges and
commentators, the long-standing, prominent history of the
petition right, Supreme Court decisions, and numerous policy
issues illustrate the need for a distinct, expansive view of the
right to petition. The expression of this right in the First
Amendment is not meant to be redundant or simply an
additional clause to further detail the freedom of speech. The
right to petition is an independent right in desperate need of
restoration to its original significance.
others today is quite the opposite: if you avail yourself of the judicial
process, you face termination from your employment and possibly other
equally painful consequences; accordingly, you had best seek your
remedies elsewhere.
Rendish, 134 F.3d at 1389 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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